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NOTES
THE  MORE?  UNIFORM  CODE  OF  MILITARY
JUSTICE  (AND  A  PRACTICAL  WAY
TO MAKE IT BETTER)
Sean Patrick Flynn*
INTRODUCTION
Army Regulation dictates that “[s]ideburns are hair grown in front of
the ear and below the point where the top portion of the ear attaches to the
head.  Sideburns will not extend below the bottom of the opening of the
ear,”1 and “[f]emales will not exceed a nail length of 1/4 inch as measured
from the tip of the finger.”2  United States Navy Uniform Regulation states
that on the right shoulder of a flight suit the “[w]eapons school patch (if
authorized) shall be worn centered on the shoulder arch, approximately 1
inch below the seam.”3
Uniformity matters to the professional appearance of those that serve in
the Armed Forces.  In some situations, uniformity may save lives.  However,
the importance placed on uniformity has not translated to uniform punish-
ments for those who violate the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ).4
In an effort to resolve this, Congress, at the request of the Department of
Defense, passed the Military Justice Act of 2016 (“the Act”).5  Among other
* Candidate for Juris Doctor, Notre Dame Law School, 2018; Bachelor of Science,
United States Military Academy at West Point, 2012.  I would like to thank Colonel Charles
L. Pritchard, Jr., for helpful suggestions at the beginning of the writing process, the Notre
Dame Law Review for providing tremendous editing and lifelong friendships, Professor Jay
Tidmarsh, my advisor, whose guidance has extended far beyond this Note, Captain Patrick
Kelly, my life editor, without whom I would be lost, and my family, for all their support.
Finally, thank you, Ann-Marie—my amazing wife—home is wherever I’m with you, I love
you.  All errors are my own.
1 U.S. Dep’t of the Army, Reg. 670-1, Wear and Appearance of Army Uniforms and
Insignia ¶ 3-2a(2)(a) (2015).
2 Id. ¶ 3-2b(4)(c).
3 U.S. Dep’t of the Navy, Uniform Regulations. art. 6803 ¶ 3a(4)(f).
4 See infra Part I.
5 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017, Pub. L. No. 114-328 (to be
codified in scattered sections of 10 U.S.C.).
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things, the Act purports to bring military sentencing more in line with the
federal sentencing system, which was created in part due to disparate
sentences.6  With the goal of increased uniformity, the federal system and
federal sentencing guidelines increased the length of sentences defendants
received across the board.7  Guidelines in the military will likely have a simi-
lar effect on military sentences.
Part I of this Note examines the current military court-martial sentenc-
ing system and analyzes some of the impetus for a change.  It also assesses the
changes, in regards to sentencing, that the Act would bring about.  Part II
examines the negative effects of the federal sentencing system.  Part III offers
suggestions for the successful transition of the military sentencing system, in
light of the responses to the federal sentencing system.  This Note concludes
that because sentencing guidelines are detrimental to the defendant, the mil-
itary sentencing process should offer a guaranteed, but waivable, two days of
preparation to the defendant post-conviction and presentencing.
I. THE CASE FOR A CHANGE IN MILITARY SENTENCING
Prior to the UCMJ, a “commander historically had virtually unchecked
control over military justice.”8  After World War II, though, protests against
an unfair and unduly harsh system led Congress to adopt the UCMJ in 1951.9
The UCMJ, and the individual services, went through many changes after its
adoption in an effort to improve military justice.10  The changes were suc-
cessful enough to prompt praise from Justice Ginsburg, who described the
new military justice system as “notably more sensitive to due process concerns
than the one prevailing through most of our country’s history.”11
A. The Current System
Chapter 47 of Title 10 in the United States Code encompasses the
UCMJ.12  Articles 55 through 58 of the UCMJ govern the military sentencing
process.13  Article 53 is also relevant, declaring, “[a] court-martial shall
6 See infra Part II.
7 See infra notes 126–31 and accompanying text.
8 Note, Prosecutorial Power and the Legitimacy of the Military Justice System, 123 HARV. L.
REV. 937, 940 (2010).
9 Id. The UCMJ “was meant to strike a balance between the individual rights of ser-
vicemembers and fairness, on the one hand, and the interest in maintaining discipline and
command authority, on the other.” Id.
10 Id. at 940–41. Those improvements included appellate courts within each branch
of the military, the creation of military judges and a requirement that one be present at
every court-martial, and independent chains of command for defense counsel. Id.
11 Weiss v. United States, 510 U.S. 163, 194 (1994) (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
12 10 U.S.C. §§ 801–946 (2012).
13 See UCMJ art. 55–58, 10 U.S.C. §§ 855–58.  Besides the sentencing of convicted ser-
vicemembers, the rest of a court-martial essentially follows the structure of a federal crimi-
nal trial.  Colin A. Kisor, The Need for Sentencing Reform in Military Courts-Martial, 58 NAVAL L.
REV. 39, 41 (2009).
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announce its findings and sentence to the parties as soon as determined.”14
Either a panel (jury) or a military judge decides the outcome of the case.15  If
guilt is found, the deciding entity determines the sentence.16
After the trial and “findings of guilty have been announced, the prosecu-
tion and defense may present [the] matter . . . to aid the court-martial in
determining an appropriate sentence.”17  A panel, composed of officers (and
at least one-third enlisted members, if the accused is enlisted and so
requests)18 who outrank the accused, receives “appropriate instructions on
sentenc[ing]” from the military judge.19  The required instructions must
include a statement of (1) any mandatory maximum or minimum, (2) the
effect of a punitive discharge and confinement or a confinement greater
than six months on the accused’s pay, (3) the procedures for deliberation,
(4) the members’ sole responsibility for choosing an appropriate sentence,
and (5) “[a] statement that the members should consider all matters in
extenuation, mitigation, and aggravation, whether introduced before or after
findings, and matters introduced under R.C.M. 1001(b)(1), (2), (3) and
(5).”20  The military judge also informs the members of the panel of the five
reasons principally considered by society in sentencing: “rehabilitation of the
wrongdoer, punishment of the wrongdoer, protection of society from the
wrongdoer, preservation of good order and discipline in the military, and
deterrence of the wrongdoer and those who know of [the] crime[ ] and . . .
sentence.”21
Currently there are only a handful of articles of the UCMJ whose viola-
tion carry any sort of mandatory minimum.  Premeditated and felony murder
carry a minimum sentence of imprisonment for life,22 and spying in a time of
war carries a minimum sentence of death.23  Any rape, sexual assault, forcible
sodomy (violations of Article 120(a) and (b)24 and Article 125),25 or attempt
to commit any of the above, carry a mandatory minimum of dismissal or dis-
14 UCMJ art. 53, 10 U.S.C. § 853.
15 Kisor, supra note 13, at 41 n.13 (“The accused at a court-martial elects a members
trial or a bench trial.  The Government cannot impose a particular forum.”).
16 See MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES, R.C.M. 1006–07 (2012) [hereinaf-
ter MCM].
17 Id. R.C.M. 1001(a)(1).
18 UCMJ art. 25, 10 U.S.C. § 825.
19 MCM, supra note 16, R.C.M. 1005(a).
20 Id. R.C.M 1005(e).  The relevant considerations under R.C.M. 1001 are service data
of the accused (including pay and time and jobs in service), any other records of the
accused’s service (to include evaluation reports, marital status and number of dependents,
and other disciplinary actions), evidence of other prior convictions, and evidence of reha-
bilitative potential (but only in the form of opinions). See id. R.C.M. 1001.
21 U.S. DEP’T. OF THE ARMY, PAMPHLET 27-9, LEGAL SERVICES: MILITARY JUDGES’
BENCHBOOK ¶ 2-6-9 (2014).
22 UCMJ art. 118, 10 U.S.C. § 918.
23 UCMJ art. 106, 10 U.S.C. § 906.
24 UCMJ art. 120(a)–(b), 10 U.S.C. § 920.
25 UCMJ art. 125, 10 U.S.C. § 925.
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honorable discharge.26  All other punitive articles of the UCMJ state that the
convicted “shall be punished as a court-martial may direct” or other similar
language.27
Upon conclusion of the court-martial “[t]he findings and sentence of a
court-martial shall be reported promptly to the convening authority after the
announcement of the sentence.”28  Although the ability has been
restricted,29 the convening authority may still grant clemency in certain situa-
tions.30  A servicemember sentenced to more than one year confinement or a
punitive discharge (dishonorable or bad conduct) receives a mandatory
review from the appropriate court of criminal appeals.31  Following review at
the Service Court of Appeals, the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces
(CAAF) reviews cases (1) with a death sentence, (2) ordered to the CAAF by
the Judge Advocate General of the relevant service, and (3) cases that it
grants review for good cause shown upon petition of the accused.32  Finally, a
case may be appealed to the United States Supreme Court.33
B. Complaints with the Current System
Critics of the current sentencing system in the military argue that, for a
panel sentencing, the jury is unfamiliar with norms for similar crimes.34  This
problem may have been exacerbated by the Supreme Court’s extension of
courts-martial jurisdiction to servicemembers even if the crime has no mili-
26 10 U.S.C.S. § 856(b)(1) (LEXIS through Pub. L. No. 114-327).  “The most serious
type of punitive discharge is a dishonorable discharge for enlisted members or a dismissal
for officer members.” Elizabeth Cameron Hernandez, Is “Mandatory Justice” Right for the
Military?, 27 FED. SENT’G REP. 131, 133 (2015).
27 UCMJ art. 81–134, 10 U.S.C. §§ 881–934.
28 UCMJ art. 60, 10 U.S.C. § 860.
29 See James E. Baker, Is Military Justice Sentencing on the March? Should It Be? And If So,
Where Should It Head? Court-Martial Sentencing Process, Practice, and Issues, 27 FED. SENT’G REP.
72, 79 (2014).  When he wrote the cited article, James E. Baker was the Chief Judge for the
United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces. See id. at 72.
30 10 U.S.C.S. § 860(c)(2)(B) (LEXIS) (“Except as provided in paragraph (4), the
convening authority . . . may approve, disapprove, commute, or suspend the sentence of
the court-martial in whole or in part.”).  The cases where the convening authority may not
grant any type of clemency are those in which the court-martial sentenced the defendant
to more than six months confinement or a dismissal, dishonorable discharge, or bad con-
duct discharge. Id. § 860(c)(4)(A).  An exception here is if the defendant provided “sub-
stantial assistance” in the investigation or prosecution of another, or a qualifying pretrial
agreement was entered. Id. § 860(c)(4)(B)–(C).
31 UCMJ art. 66(b)(1), 10 U.S.C. § 866.  The branches of the military have separate
courts of criminal appeals.  The Army, Air Force, and Coast Guard have their own, and the
Navy and Marine Corps (as a part of the Navy) both appeal to the Navy-Marine Corps
Court of Criminal Appeals. See Kisor, supra note 13, at 42.
32 UCMJ art. 67, 10 U.S.C. § 867.
33 Kisor, supra note 13, at 42.
34 Id. at 44 (“[M]embers often lack sufficient experience with the criminal justice sys-
tem to determine reasonable lengths of prison terms in the absence of guidance . . . .”).
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tary connection.35  While panel members may be well suited to understand
the gravity and appropriate sentencing for military-related offenses, for other
cases they may “have no frame of reference.”36  Members are not permitted
to receive information about sentences for other comparative cases, unless it
is introduced by the defense, at which point the prosecution may respond.37
In some cases, jurors will readily admit they are unprepared and ill equipped
to deliver an appropriate sentence to a convicted servicemember38 because
they are cognizant “that the accused’s sentence should not be considerably
different from other accused who are similarly situated.”39
Also relevant in a military context is that the jury members, for the most
part, are subordinates of the authority who convened the general court-mar-
tial.  Therefore, the UCMJ specifically prohibits unlawful command influ-
ence, because of the concern that it may cause a miscarriage of justice.40  It
states:
No authority convening a general, special, or summary court-martial,
nor any other commanding officer, may censure, reprimand, or admonish
the court or any member, military judge, or counsel thereof, with respect to
the findings or sentence adjudged by the court, or with respect to any other
exercise of its or his functions in the conduct of the proceeding.  No person
subject to this chapter may attempt to coerce or, by any unauthorized
means, influence the action of a court-martial or any other military tribunal
or any member thereof, in reaching the findings or sentence in any case, or
the action of any convening, approving, or reviewing authority with respect
to his judicial acts.41
The arguments for and against jury sentencing in the military are similar
to those in civilian criminal justice.42  One argument in favor of jury sentenc-
ing is that “jury members are better able to express the community’s outrage
at an offender’s violation of its norms.”43  Another is that juries will not feel
political pressure to sentence in a certain way.44  But in the military context,
“[t]his argument carries little to no weight . . . because military judges are not
elected and they report through a separate chain of command from the con-
35 See Solario v. United States, 483 U.S. 435, 450–51 (1987).
36 Steven J. Ehlenbeck, Court-Martial Sentencing with Members: A Shot in the Dark?, 35
REP. 33, 34 (2008).
37 Megan N. Schmid, This Court-Martial Hereby (Arbitrarily) Sentences You: Problems with
Court Member Sentencing in the Military and Proposed Solutions, 67 A.F. L. REV. 245, 252 (2011).
38 See James A. Young III, Revising the Court Member Selection Process, 163 MIL. L. REV. 91,
111 n.112 (2000) (presenting anecdotal evidence that “several officers who sat on courts-
martial complained that military judges did not provide them realistic guidance on how to
determine an appropriate sentence”).
39 Id. at 114.
40 See UCMJ art. 37(a), 10 U.S.C. § 837 (2012).
41 Id.
42 See generally Brian M. Thompson, Judge-Only Sentencing: Judicial Power Grab?, 36
REPORTER 12 (2009).
43 Schmid, supra note 37, at 255.
44 Id.
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vening authority.”45  In fact, given the facts of command and evaluations, the
military juries may actually feel more pressure to impose a harsh sentence
than a military judge.
Moreover, the current sentencing system can lead to unacceptable dis-
parities in sentences for crimes with similar facts.  For example, in November
of 1994, Private First Class (PFC) Looney was with some friends before going
out to the bars.46  PFC Looney “displayed a knife to his companions and
indicated that he was ‘ready’ if any trouble broke out and that he had the
group ‘covered.’”47  After drinking throughout the evening, although not
getting drunk, PFC Looney and one of his good friends (the victim) got into
a physical altercation.  Punches were being thrown and landed, and eventu-
ally another soldier stepped in between.48  While the soldier was restraining
PFC Looney the victim punched PFC Looney in the face.  The soldier then
turned to restrain the victim and PFC Looney “landed what appeared to be a
direct blow to [the victim’s] upper body.”49  PFC Looney immediately left the
establishment and, while his friends followed, the victim collapsed, and later
died due to a “lateral, penetrating stab wound to the heart, entering from the
left side of the chest.”50  PFC Looney was convicted of unpremeditated mur-
der and sentenced to 120 months confinement.51
In a separate incident, PFC Saulsberry and his roommates were watching
television in his barracks room.52  Evidence showed that PFC Saulsberry did
not really “fit in” with his unit, and the other soldiers “constantly teased and
criticized him.”53  Another soldier in the unit (the victim) entered the room,
took a drink from the fridge, and began changing the channels on the televi-
sion.  An argument between PFC Saulsberry and the victim turned into a
shoving match.54  PFC Saulsberry turned to retreat and the victim “attacked
him from behind, threw him on the bed, and put his hands around his
throat.”55  The other soldiers broke it up, and while the victim was speaking
to one of them, PFC Saulsberry “retreated to the corner of the room and sat
on his bed, muttering and playing with a boot knife.”56  Shortly thereafter,
the victim again approached PFC Saulsberry and began taunting and cursing
at him.57  PFC Saulsberry “stood up and jabbed the knife” at the victim, who
“died as a result of a single stab wound that penetrated between two ribs and
45 Id.





51 Id. at 682.  PFC Looney was tried before a military judge. Id.
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pierced his heart.”58  PFC Saulsberry was convicted of unpremeditated mur-
der and sentenced to 360 months confinement.59  PFC Saulsberry was sen-
tenced to 240 more months confinement for a crime similar to the one PFC
Looney committed.
Sentencing disparity exists in other crimes too.  Seaman Kirkman was
convicted for rape, where the victim was drunk and regained consciousness
while he was raping her.  Seaman Kirkman was sentenced to eighty-nine days
confinement and given a bad-conduct discharge.60  Hospitalman Apprentice
Iberra, one pay grade below Seaman Kirkman, raped a drunk victim who
woke up during the rape, and he was sentenced to forty-eight months con-
finement and received a dishonorable discharge.61
The sentencing disparity at the trial level is not just anecdotal.  General
courts-martial for violations of Article 118 (murder)62 have produced a stan-
dard deviation in sentencing of 172 months (for convictions not including
life as a minimum sentence).63  In general courts-martial for Article 120 vio-
lations (rape),64 the standard deviation among all four branches for sentenc-
ing is 155 months confinement, and 196 months confinement if all sentences
of twenty-four months or less are not factored in.65  Finally, violations of Arti-
cle 112(a)(3) (wrongful distribution of a controlled substance)66 resulted in
a standard deviation in sentencing of thirty-one months.67
The lack of uniform military sentencing presented is perhaps unsurpris-
ing given that the Court of Military Appeals (the precursor to the Court of
Appeals for the Armed Forces) determined in United States v. Mamaluy that
uniformity in sentencing throughout the Armed Forces is not something with
which a court-martial should concern itself.68  This took greater effect when
58 Id.
59 Id. at 493.  PFC Saulsberry was convicted and sentenced before a panel consisting of
officers and enlisted personnel.  PFC Saulsberry’s murder conviction was later reduced to
voluntary manslaughter, and a mandated rehearing resulted in seventy-eight months con-
finement, which was approved by the convening authority. Id. at 493–94.
60 United States v. Kirkman, No. NMCM 98 01264, 2000 WL 349760, at *1 (N-M. Ct.
Crim. App. Mar. 30, 2000).  Seaman Kirkman was convicted and sentenced by a panel of
officers and enlisted members.
61 United States v. Ibarra, 53 M.J. 616, 617 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. 2000).  Hospitalman
Apprentice Iberra was also convicted and sentenced by a panel of officers and enlisted
members.  His conviction was later overturned by the Navy-Marine Corps Court of Crimi-
nal Appeals because of plain error on the part of the military judge in allowing testimony
concerning the invocation of a right to counsel and against unreasonable search and
seizure.  The testimony concerned the search for a drug used to possibly incapacitate the
defendant. Id. at 618.
62 UCMJ art. 118, 10 U.S.C. § 918 (2012).
63 Steven M. Immel, Development, Adoption, and Implementation of Military Sentencing
Guidelines, 165 MIL. L. REV. 159, 192 (2000).
64 UCMJ art. 120, 10 U.S.C. § 920.
65 Immel, supra note 63, at 191.
66 UCMJ art. 112(a)(3), 10 U.S.C. § 912.
67 Immel, supra note 63, at 192.
68 See United States v. Mamaluy, 27 C.M.R. 176, 180 (C.M.A. 1959).
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“sentence uniformity was deleted as a sentencing goal in the 1969 Manual for
Courts-Martial.”69  It was believed that the appellate courts would ensure sen-
tence uniformity by monitoring and fixing inappropriate sentences.70  How-
ever, given the strict standards for appellate review, most sentences are left
intact.71  Therefore, sentencing disparity at the trial level will likely be carried
out.72
C. The Proposed Solution to Military Sentencing
In response to a request from senior military officials, in October 2013
then-Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel directed a review of the UCMJ and
the Manual for Courts-Martial.73  The task was assigned to the General Coun-
sel of the Department of Defense, who in turn established the Military Justice
Review Group (MJRG).74  In December 2015, the Defense Department “for-
warded to Congress a legislative proposal outlining a number of reforms [to]
[t]he UCMJ[,] . . . the statutory framework of the military justice system.”75
It consisted of “37 statutory additions and substantive amendments to 68 cur-
rent provisions of the UCMJ.”76  The proposals were intended to: (1)
strengthen the structure of the military justice system, (2) enhance fairness
and efficiency in pretrial and trial procedures, (3) modernize military sen-
tencing, (4) streamline the post-trial process, (5) reform military appellate
practice, and (6) update the punitive articles.77
In order to modernize military sentencing, the MJRG proposed
[r]eplacing the current sentencing standard (which relies on maximum
punishments with minimal criteria in adjudging a sentence below the maxi-
mum) with a system of judicial discretion guided by parameters and crite-
ria[,] . . . [e]nsuring that each offense receives separate consideration for
purposes of sentencing to confinement[,] . . . [i]mproving military plea
agreements by allowing negotiated ranges of punishments and adjudged
sentences within the range[,] . . . [c]ontinuing to permit appeals of
sentences by servicemembers, and establishing government appeals of
sentences in circumstances similar to federal civilian practice[,] . . . [and]
69 Immel, supra note 63, at 172.
70 See id. at 193 n.309.
71 Id. (“The appellate courts review a sentence on uniformity grounds only if the cases
are closely related and highly similar.  The standard of review is abuse of discretion or
preventing an obvious miscarriage of justice.  The end result is that the appellate courts
review very few cases on sentence uniformity issues.  Since the appellate courts review very
few cases on sentence uniformity grounds, and when they do review a case the standard of
review is very high, the vast majority of sentences are left intact.”).
72 See id.
73 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Def., Defense Department Proposes UCMJ Changes
(Dec. 28, 2015), http://www.defense.gov/News/Article/Article/638108/defense-depart
ment-proposes-ucmj-changes.
74 MIL. JUST. REV. GROUP, http://ogc.osd.mil/mjrg.html (last visited May 18, 2017).
75 Press Release, supra note 73.
76 Id.
77 Id.
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[p]roviding for the effective implementation of [sentencing] reforms by
establishing sentencing by military judges in all non-capital trials.78
The amendments take place over two phases.  Phase One creates and
implements the Military Sentencing Parameters and Criteria Board (“the
Board”).79  During Phase One the Board will “begin the process of gathering
sentencing data for the development of sentencing parameters and crite-
ria.”80  The Board, in coming up with its parameters and criteria, is expected
to “draw upon best practices at the federal and state level.”81  The Board will
be responsible for developing interim guidance, established by the President,
which will be used until Phase Two, which begins four years after enact-
ment.82  Also in Phase One, “judicial sentencing in all non-capital . . . courts-
martial would take effect.”83  More similar to civilian courts, all information
will be provided to the judge to reach an appropriate sentence, and the sys-
tem will do away with unitary sentencing.84  The “sentencing parameter for
an offense would set a boundary on the judge’s discretion, subject to a depar-
ture for case specific reasons set forth by the judge in the record.”85
In Phase Two, the “parameters and criteria approved by the President”
apply to sentencing.86  A key component of this phase is the authorization of
the Government to appeal sentences.  The MJRG asserted that this would
reduce the impetus for “rigid mandatory minimum sentences.”87  Further,
military judges will retain the ability to adjudge a sentence outside the param-
eters, as long as they provide reasons for the departure on the record.88
78 Press Release, Military Justice Review Grp., Summary of Major Legislative Proposals
(Dec. 28, 2015), http://www.dod.gov/dodgc/images/summary.pdf.
79 MILITARY JUSTICE REVIEW GRP., MILITARY JUSTICE ACT OF 2016: SECTION-BY-SECTION
ANALYSIS 18–19 (2015), http://www.dod.gov/dodgc/images/military_justice_sectional
.pdf.  The Board “would be composed of the chief trial judge of each service . . . and the
Secretary of Defense would select a chair and vice-chair.” Id. at 20–21.
80 Id. at 18.
81 Id. at 19.  The MJRG also notes that parameters would “replace the current practice
of adjudging sentences with little or no guidance.” Id.
82 Id. at 18–19.
83 Id. at 18.
84 See id.  Unitary sentencing is where a single sentence is “adjudged for all offenses for
which there has been a finding of guilty without any explanation as to how the sentence
was reached or which portions of the sentence are attributable to which offense.” Id.
85 Id. at 19.  It is important to note that “[s]entencing parameters would not be
required for those offenses for which it would be impracticable to set a parameter, such as
unique military offenses that vary greatly in seriousness depending on the context.” Id.
86 Id.
87 Id.  It appears that the MJRG is attempting to remove the mandatory minimums
that currently apply in only a very small subset of cases. See supra notes 21–26 and accom-
panying text.
88 Id.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\92-5\NDL513.txt unknown Seq: 10  5-JUL-17 15:52
2188 notre dame law review [vol. 92:5
Although the Board is given the responsibility of establishing sentencing
criteria,89 the Military Justice Act includes some baseline considerations that
a judge must consider when imposing a sentence:
[A] court-martial shall impose punishment that is sufficient, but not greater
than necessary, to promote justice and to maintain good order and disci-
pline in the armed forces, taking into consideration—
(A) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and
characteristics of the accused;
(B) the impact of the offense on—(i) the financial, social, psychologi-
cal, or medical well-being of any victim of the offense; and (ii) the mission,
discipline, or efficiency of the command of the accused and any victim of the
offense;
(C) the need for the sentence—(i) to reflect the seriousness of the
offense; (ii) to promote respect for the law; (iii) to provide just punishment
for the offense; (iv) to promote adequate deterrence of misconduct; (v) to
protect others from further crimes by the accused; (vi) to rehabilitate the
accused; and (vii) to provide, in appropriate cases, the opportunity for
retraining and return to duty to meet the needs of the service; and
(D) the sentences available under this chapter.90
The Military Justice Act of 2016 brings court-martial sentencing more in
line with civilian trials.  Court-martial sentencing still retains its military char-
acter, most clearly with the continued focus on good order and discipline.
However, the Act also takes away some autonomy from the military structure.
Imposing guidelines will canalize the ability of judges to punish as they see
fit.  The defendant’s unit, represented by the panel members, also loses its
role in sentencing.  Reaction to the recommended changes has been
mixed.91  Nonetheless, both the Senate and House absorbed the recom-
mended changes from the MJRG and inserted them verbatim into the
89 Id. (defining the sentencing criteria as “factors that a judge must consider when
sentencing a case, but that do not propose a specific punishment”).
90 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017, Pub. L. No. 114-328, 130
Stat. 2919 (to be codified in scattered sections of 10 U.S.C.) (internal quotation marks
omitted).  The factors to be considered are much more extensive than previously provided,
especially when considering that the previous instructions were to a jury full of officers and
possibly enlisted personnel who did not necessarily have an extensive familiarity with the
law and its purposes, whereas here the guidance is going solely to a military judge, trained
in the practice of adjudicating. See supra notes 18–20 and accompanying text.
91 Compare Colby Vokey, The Gutting of Military Justice (Again), COLBYVOKEY.COM (Oct.
19, 2016), http://colbyvokey.com/the-gutting-of-military-justice-again/  (“The Military Jus-
tice Act of 2016 may just be the death knell of military justice and the rights of military
servicemembers.”), with Clara Spera, Amending the Uniform Code of Military Justice to Mirror
Civilian Courts, LAWFARE (Jan. 12, 2016 2:02 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/amending-
uniform-code-military-justice-mirror-civilian-courts (“[S]hifting the military justice system
closer to the civilian criminal justice model may help the military overcome the perception
that in military tribunals the deck is stacked against victims of sexual assault.”).
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National Defense Authorization Act for 2017,92 which became law on Decem-
ber 23, 2016.93
II. THE FEDERAL SENTENCING SYSTEM
Despite good intentions, the implementation of the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines has been to the detriment of defendants.  Before the Guidelines,
“[j]udges were free to sentence defendants to any term authorized by the
penal code,” and sometimes “offenders convicted of equivalent offenses . . .
served disparate sentences.”94  Because of this, “some critics began to con-
demn the horror stories about identical offenders before different judges”
receiving disparate sentences.95  Frustration with the sentencing system and
concerns about crime led Congress to take action.96  The Federal Sentencing
Guidelines began with the Sentencing Reform Act of 198497 (“the Act”),
which created the United States Sentencing Commission (“the
Commission”).98
The Commission originally consisted of seven voting members and a
nonvoting member,99 and had the express tasks of “establish[ing] sentencing
policies and practices for the Federal criminal justice system” and
92 Compare MILITARY JUSTICE REVIEW GRP., supra note 79, with National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017, H.R. 4909, 114th Cong. (2016), and National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017, S. 2943, 114th Cong. (2016).
93 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017, Pub. L. No. 114-328, 130
Stat. 2025 (to be codified in scattered sections of 10 U.S.C.).  There was never really any
concern about the act passing once it was inserted into the NDAA. See Jessica C. Abrahams
& Kevin J. Lombardo, November Elections Loom over Congress’ Continued Progress on National
Defense Authorization Act, LEXOLOGY (Oct. 11, 2016), http://www.lexology.com/library/
detail.aspx?g⊃⊃999378-599a-4f12-a631-c52c355fde8b (“Although differences remain
unresolved in conference and between Congress and the Administration, the NDAA has
been signed into law every year for more than 50 straight years, and while continued negotiations
and horse-trading must take place after the November elections, ultimately the NDAA will
become law before year’s end.” (emphasis added)).
94 J.C. Oleson, Blowing Out All the Candles: A Few Thoughts on the Twenty-Fifth Birthday of
the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, 45 U. RICH. L. REV. 693, 700 (2011) (citing Williams v. New
York, 337 U.S. 241, 247 (1949), superseded by statute, Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L.
No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1988, 1989 (codified in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C. and 28 U.S.C.)).
95 Id.  Senator “Kennedy came to view sentencing in the federal courts as ‘a disgrace,’
‘a national scandal,’ a ‘glaring flaw,’ in ‘utter disarray,’ ‘hopelessly inconsistent,’ ‘arbitrary,’
and ‘desperately’ in need of reform.”  KATE STITH & JOSE´ A. CABRANES, FEAR OF JUDGING:
SENTENCING GUIDELINES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS 38 (1998).
96 See STITH & CABRANES, supra note 95, at 38–48.
97 Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987.  The Act was passed with “broad, bipartisan sup-
port” and an “enthusiastic” President Reagan. STITH & CABRANES, supra note 95, at 48.
98 Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987, 2017.  “There is established as an independent
commission in the judicial branch of the United States a United States Sentencing Com-
mission . . . .” Id.
99 Id.  The President is responsible for appointing voting members of the Commission,
with approval from the Senate.  A minimum of three members of the Commission had to
be active federal judges, and no more than four members could be from the same political
party. Id.  The members were removable only for good cause. Id. at 2018.  The minimum
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“develop[ing] means of measuring the degree to which the sentencing,
penal, and correctional practices are effective in meeting the purposes of
sentencing.”100  The Act assisted the Commission by detailing organically the
things judges should consider for imposing a sentence.101  They included:
(1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and
characteristics of the defendant;
(2) the need for the sentence imposed—(A) to reflect the seriousness
of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just punish-
ment for the offense; (B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct;
(C) to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; and (D) to
provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training, medi-
cal care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner;
(3) the kinds of sentences available;
(4) the kinds of sentence and the sentencing range established for the
applicable category of offense committed by the applicable category of
defendant as set forth in the guidelines that are issued by the Sentencing
Commission pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 994(a)(1) and that are in effect on the
date the defendant is sentenced;
(5) any pertinent policy statement issued by the Sentencing Commis-
sion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 994(a)(2) and that is in effect on the date the
defendant is sentenced; and
(6) the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defend-
ants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct.102
In short, the Act “did not give the Commission a clean slate upon which
to draft its Guidelines.”103  Congress intended the Commission to focus on
the generally recognized purposes of punishment.104  However, Congress did
not specify what purpose would predominate.105
The lack of a clear sentencing philosophy was felt early by the Commis-
sion106and “[f]or the first eighteen months of its existence, [it] debated and
of three federal judges was changed to a maximum with the Feeney Amendment to the
PROTECT Act.  Oleson, supra note 94, at 732.
100 Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 2017, 2018.
101 See id. at 1989.
102 Id. at 1989–90.
103 STITH & CABRANES, supra note 95, at 52.
104 Id.  The four purposes of punishment are generally recognized as retribution, deter-
rence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation.  Oleson, supra note 94, at 696.
105 See STITH & CABRANES, supra note 95, at 52 (“Congress in the Sentencing Reform
Act had failed to adopt any particular philosophy of punishment.”); Paul J. Hofer & Mark
H. Allenbaugh, The Reason Behind the Rules: Finding and Using the Philosophy of the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 19, 29 (2003) (“[T]he SRA does not specify
priorities among these purposes or explain how the well-known tensions among them
should be resolved.”).
106 However, the Commission did take the interest in sentencing uniformity to heart,
claiming more than a decade after its creation that “[e]liminating unwarranted sentencing
disparity was the primary goal of the Sentencing Reform Act.”  PAUL J. HOFER ET AL., U.S.
SENTENCING COMM’N, FIFTEEN YEARS OF GUIDELINES SENTENCING: AN ASSESSMENT OF HOW
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drafted competing versions of the Guidelines, each built on fundamentally
different philosophies.”107  A clear philosophy was never attained, and some
of the Commission’s members even resigned because of it.108  The Commis-
sion ultimately adopted an approach that sampled ten thousand cases and
“determined the average sentences for various types of crime and the aggra-
vating and mitigating factors that were significantly correlated with increases
or decreases in the sentences, along with each factor’s magnitude.”109
While the Commission never chose a formal philosophy for sentencing,
it did appear to be “significantly influenced” by a stricter, quantitative
calculus.110  In fact, the Guidelines go further than the Act calls for in ensur-
ing that additional harms are met with additional punishment.111  Still, even
in the years since its creation the Commission has not resolved nor even
addressed its sentencing philosophy.112
Before understanding any critique of the Guidelines, it is important to
have a basic understanding of how they work.  Fortunately, the Commission
provides a handy overview of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines.113  The
overview explains the Guidelines’s creation of a formulaic sentencing chart,
which “take[s] into account both the seriousness of the offense and the
offender’s criminal history.”114  There are forty-three levels of offense serious-
ness (one being the least serious), and each type of crime has a base offense
level.115  The sentencing judge begins by determining the base offense level
for the crime committed (for multiple counts the judge begins with the most
serious offense), and then looks to see if there are any specific offense char-
acteristics to consider.  If so, they get added to the base offense level.  For
example, robbery has a base offense level of twenty; if a firearm was bran-
dished during the robbery there must be a five-level increase, and if a firearm
was discharged there must be a seven-level increase.116  There are also adjust-
WELL THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM IS ACHIEVING THE GOALS OF SENTENCING
REFORM 79 (2004), http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publica-
tions/research-projects-and-surveys/miscellaneous/15-year-study/15_year_study_full.pdf.
107 Hofer & Allenbaugh, supra note 105, at 31.
108 Id.
109 Id. at 33 (citing U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT ON THE INITIAL
SENTENCING GUIDELINES AND POLICY STATEMENTS 16 (1987), http://www.ussc.gov/sites/de
fault/files/pdf/guidelines-manual/1987/manual-pdf/1987_Supplementary_Report_Initi
al_Sentencing_Guidelines.pdf.); see id. at 17–19.
110 STITH & CABRANES, supra note 95, at 55.  This approach more mirrors the philoso-
phy of Commissioner Robinson, a law professor at Rutgers, who believed that the purpose
of sentencing was to achieve retribution, and that this is best accomplished with a “sentenc-
ing calculus,” a detailed and complex sentencing system. See id. at 50–53.
111 Id. at 55; see also 28 U.S.C. § 994(a)(l) (2012).
112 STITH & CABRANES, supra note 95, at 56.
113 See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, AN OVERVIEW OF THE FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDE-
LINES, http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/about/overview/Overview_Federal_
Sentencing_Guidelines.pdf.
114 Id. at 1.
115 Id.
116 Id.
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ments that may apply to any crime and can be mitigating, such as being a
minimal participant (a four-level decrease), or aggravating, such as knowing
the victim is unusually vulnerable (a two-level increase).117  Finally, accept-
ance of responsibility may result in up to a two-level decrease.118  The final
number arrived at through this system determines the placement along the y-
axis.  The judge then determines the criminal history category (situated
along the x-axis), which is six categories with I being the least serious and
first-time offenders, and VI being the most serious.  The point at which the
offense level and criminal history categories intersect determines the sen-
tencing guideline in months.119
The response to the Guidelines has been mixed, at best.  Many scholars
argue that the system needs to be improved,120 and others that it needs to be
abolished.121  The common complaints are that the Guidelines are too
severe, complex, and rigid.122
While a primary motivation for the Sentencing Guidelines was curbing
sentence disparity, Congress made clear the direction in which it believed the
disparity should be resolved.123  Congress directed the Commission to “spec-
ify a sentence to a term of imprisonment at or near the maximum term
authorized” for certain types of crimes.124  Congress further stipulated that
“[t]he Commission shall insure that the guidelines reflect the fact that, in
many cases, current sentences do not accurately reflect the seriousness of the
offense.”125
117 Id. at 2.
118 Id.
119 Id. at 2–3.
120 See Frank O. Bowman, III, Nothing Is Not Enough: Fix the Absurd Post-Booker Federal
Sentencing System, 24 FED. SENT’G REP. 356, 366 (2012) (“The Sentencing Commission’s
rule-making process should be made more akin to that required of other independent
agencies by the Administrative Procedure Act and other governmental openness statutes,
and a mechanism for direct judicial review of the Commission’s rules should be devised.”);
Oleson, supra note 94, at 763 (“Instead of basing federal sentences on political intuitions,
the Commission could provide sentencing judges with meaningful data about which availa-
ble sentences are most effective in reducing recidivism.”). But see Paul G. Cassell, Too
Severe?: A Defense of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines (and a Critique of Federal Mandatory Mini-
mums), 56 STAN. L. REV. 1017, 1020 (2004) (“While the Guidelines may be tough, they
merely impose the kind of punishment that society expects for serious federal offenses.”).
121 See Mark Osler, Death to These Guidelines, and a Clean Sheet of Paper, 21 FED. SENT’G
REP. 7, 7 (2008) (“The Guidelines produced from these policy goals are a baffling set of
complexities that do nothing well other than increase incarceration and guarantee the full
employment of sentencing experts.  It is time to start over.”); Erik Luna, Misguided Guide-
lines: A Critique of Federal Sentencing 23 (Cato Inst. Policy Analysis, Paper No. 458, 2002)
(“American conceptions of justice demand that the Guidelines be scrapped and the com-
mission disbanded.”).
122 Oleson, supra note 94, at 707.
123 See 28 U.S.C. § 994 (2012).
124 Id. § 994(h). But see 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012) (“The court shall impose a sen-
tence sufficient, but not greater than necessary . . . .”).
125 28 U.S.C. § 994(m).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\92-5\NDL513.txt unknown Seq: 15  5-JUL-17 15:52
2017] the  more?  uniform  code  of  military  justice 2193
The impact on increased sentence length due to the Guidelines is real
and observable.  Since the adoption of the Guidelines, federal sentences have
increased drastically,126 and federal sentences are significantly harsher than
state sentences on average.127  The severity of the sentences has led to an
outcry among judges,128 politicians,129 families,130 and academics.131
The complexity of the Guidelines is another issue.  Given how the over-
view that the Commission provides breaks down the sentencing process, it is
reasonable to believe that the system is a relatively straightforward math
problem.132  Determine the defendant’s x- and y-axes, and you have your
sentence range.  However, the impression of mathematical certainty is one
thing critics attack:
126 See STITH & CABRANES, supra note 95, at 63 tbl.1 (demonstrating that the seven years
after the Guidelines have seen markedly longer sentences than did the nine years prior).
All crimes have an average sentence length of twenty-two more months.  While robbery has
a thirty-nine-month-shorter sentence length, its time served is still thirty-nine months more
than before the Guidelines. Id.
127 See Oleson, supra note 94, at 707–08 (“[T]here’s little doubt that sentences associ-
ated with crimes charged under federal jurisdiction are dramatically longer than equivalent
crimes charged in state courts.”); see also MATTHEW DUROSE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS,
STATE COURT SENTENCING OF CONVICTED FELONS, 2004—STATISTICAL TABLES tbl.1.10
(2007), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/html/scscf04/tables/scs04110tab.cfm (demon-
strating that most federal crimes result in significantly higher sentences than state crimes).
However, one large exception to the rule is murder, which has an average sentence in state
courts of 232 months, compared to 111 months in federal courts.  Yet, violent crime as a
whole carries twenty-eight months more in federal court.  Drug and weapons offenses are
particularly more severe, with an average of fifty-three and fifty-two more months, respec-
tively. Id.
128 See, e.g., Anthony M. Kennedy, Assoc. Justice, Supreme Court of the U.S., Speech at
the American Bar Association Annual Meeting (Aug. 9, 2003), http://www.supremecourt
us.gov/publicinfo/speeches/sp_08-09-03.html (“Our resources are misspent, our punish-
ments too severe, our sentences too long.”); see also Elaine Cassel, Federal Judge Quits, Assails
Unjust Sentencing Guidelines, COUNTERPUNCH (June 24, 2003), http://www.counterpunch
.org/2003/06/24/federal-judge-quits-assails-unjust-sentencing-guidelines/.
129 See Ann E. Marimow, All Agree His Sentence Was Too Harsh, But He May Still Stay Locked
Up Forever, WASH. POST (Mar. 22, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/public-
safety/all-agree-his-sentence-was-too-harsh-but-he-may-still-stay-locked-up-forever/2016/
03/22/0d34aea2-ed3e-11e5-bc08-3e03a5b41910_story.html (“President Obama and
lawmakers on Capitol Hill[ ] are working to roll back decades of prison sentences, set
down during the nation’s war on drugs, that they see as excessively harsh.”).
130 See My Story: Simeon F., FAMM, http://famm.org/my-story-simeon-f/ (last visited
May 18, 2017) (“[A] misguided sentence . . . has cost society more than it stands to impact
[my incarcerated son, Paul].  Paul does not need to be imprisoned for another decade.  He
needs to be released and reunited with his family.”).
131 See, e.g., Frank O. Bowman, III, The Failure of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: A Struc-
tural Analysis, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1315, 1328 (2005) (“At or near the root of virtually every
serious criticism of the guidelines is the concern that they are too harsh, that federal law
requires imposition of prison sentences too often and for terms that are too long.”); John
S. Martin, Jr., Cruel and Usual: Sentencing in the Federal Courts, 26 PACE L. REV. 489, 490
(2006) (“[O]verly severe sentences are being applied to low level violators.”).
132 See supra notes 113–19 and accompanying text.
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Voila!  A human being has been transformed from a multidimensional
being into a string of letters and numbers . . . for internment in a federal
penitentiary.  The defendant is now a two-dimensional character . . . .
[F]ederal judges cannot consider . . . age, education, vocational skills,
mental and emotional condition, physical condition, drug or alcohol depen-
dence, lack of guidance as a youth, employment history, family ties and
responsibilities, community ties, military and public service, and charitable
works.133
Furthermore, the mathematical formula in practice can turn out to be
not so simple.  The system “sometimes result[s] in sentences that are off by
years.”134  The system has been empirically demonstrated as susceptible to
error.  A study on the reliability of the Guidelines showed that “[o]fficers
applying the relevant conduct rules produce[ ] widely divergent outcomes,
ranging from 57 to 136 months for the first defendant, 37 to 136 months for
the second defendant, and 24 to 136 months for the third defendant.”135
Finally, the system is faulted for being too rigid.  In 2003, Congress
attempted to make the Guidelines even more rigid by passing the Feeney
Amendment to the PROTECT Act.136  The Feeney Amendment “was a slap
in the face of federal judges” and took incredible strides to limit downward
departures from the Guidelines.137  However, in United States v. Booker the
Supreme Court “severed and excised” the provision of the federal sentencing
statute that made the Guidelines mandatory.138  But the Guidelines were
allowed to stand and still had to be consulted by sentencing judges.139  None-
theless, the decision to make the Guidelines explicitly advisory did not result
in defendants receiving less harsh sentences from judges.  It is maintained
that “[s]o long as the rules prescribe unduly lengthy sentences, post-Booker
133 Erik Luna, Gridland: An Allegorical Critique of Federal Sentencing, 96 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMI-
NOLOGY 25, 38–39 (2005) (“Under the Guidelines, judges thus confront defendants as
numbers rather than as human beings.”).
134 Luna, supra note 121, at 12.
135 Oleson, supra note 94, at 714 n.129 (citing Pamela B. Lawrence & Paul J. Hofer, An
Empirical Study of the Application of the Relevant Conduct Guideline § 1B1.3, 10 FED. SENT’G REP.
16, 18–19 (1997)).
136 See Pub. L. No 108-21, § 401, 117 Stat. 650, 667 (2003) (codified at 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(b) (2012)).
137 Oleson, supra note 94, at 731 (“It prohibited judges from departing downward in
almost all cases involving child pornography, sexual abuse, or sex trafficking; prohibited
the Commission from establishing any new grounds for downward departures for two
years; and directed the Commission to reduce the number of available downward depar-
tures.” (footnotes omitted)).  The Feeney Amendment was, in part, due to federal judges
departing from the guidelines, and Congress’s displeasure with them. See David Beck, Is
Our Judiciary Under Serious Attack? Separation of Powers, 67 TEX. B.J. 974, 976–77 (2004); see
also infra note 141 and accompanying text.
138 See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245 (2005).
139 Id.  “[T]he federal sentencing statute as amended makes the Guidelines effectively
advisory.  It requires a sentencing court to consider Guidelines ranges, but it permits the
court to tailor the sentence in light of other statutory concerns . . . .” Id. at 245–46 (cita-
tions omitted).
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experience suggests that most defendants for whom those sentences are pre-
scribed will get them, or at best sentences only slightly lower.”140
Further, although the Guidelines are now explicitly only advisory, rever-
sal or binding rules are not the only tools that could be employed against
recalcitrant judges.  Prior to the Booker decision, Congress threatened to sub-
poena records related to a federal judge’s sentencing decisions.141  Although
infrequently exercised, this power nonetheless may motivate some judges to
stay inside the Guidelines just to avoid having their decisions called into
question.
Intentionally or not, just or not, Guidelines are detrimental to defend-
ants during sentencing.  The next Part of this Note will compare the changes
in the Military Justice Act of 2016 to the current federal system and suggest
how the Act can best be implemented.
III. HOW TO BEST MOVE FORWARD WITH MILITARY SENTENCING
All things being equal, the implementation of the Guidelines will likely
be to the detriment of military defendants.  However, a deliberate approach
by the Board and a two-day delay prior to sentencing can lead to more effec-
tive sentences.  In creating the Commission, Congress both burdened it with
countless objectives and provided no primary direction.142  It is generally
accepted that the Commission has never tackled this problem, and the lack
of a clear sentencing philosophy plagues its Guidelines.143  The Board does
not face as daunting a charter, in that its creating language is more open.144
Establishing two advisory groups145 is really its only explicit guidance in the
creation of its parameters.
However, this lack of conflicting guidance is not a golden ticket to a
successful mission.  The Board, full of different lawyers with different back-
grounds and ideas, will still face the issue of developing a sentencing philoso-
phy for the entire Department of Defense.146  Furthermore, the Board will
have to juggle this with the additional military justice goal of maintaining
good order and discipline.  Congress, through the MJRG, may have given a
140 Bowman, supra note 120, at 360.
141 See Tresa Baldas, Congress Comes After a Federal Judge; Sentencing at Issue in Subpoena
Uproar, NAT’L L.J., (Mar. 24, 2003), http://www.nationallawjournal.com/id=9000055347
45/Congress-Comes-After-a-Federal-Judge?slreturn=20161017231037 (“[U.S. District Court
Judge James] Rosenbaum . . . is accused of imposing unlawfully light sentences.”).  It was
argued that Congress did this in “an effort to chill and intimidate judges by subjecting
their decisions to this kind of data and collection and review.” Id.
142 See supra notes 106–12 and accompanying text.
143 See supra notes 106–12 and accompanying text.
144 See MILITARY JUSTICE REVIEW GRP., supra note 79, at 21.
145 Id.  The first advisory group will consist of “senior officer and enlisted members who
provide guidance on the effectiveness of military justice on discipline.”  Id.  The second
group will consist of military justice practitioners.  Id.
146 While the Act does not specify that the MJRG must create this philosophy, a clear
philosophy is vital moving forward and will show itself in the sentencing parameters the
MJRG produces.
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hint to the Board that its focus should first be on good order and discipline.
The language of the Act, in regards to sentencing, claims the punishment
shall “promote justice and . . . maintain good order and discipline” taking
into consideration the other sentencing philosophies.147  Good order and
discipline is to be maintained through the effective use of other philoso-
phies, not the other way around.148  In contrast to the principles under
which the civilian panel operated, these directions may allow for more
directed parameters.  But the Board may still have to wrestle with what theory
of punishment best promotes good order and discipline and how best to go
about emphasizing that theory.
Regardless of how the Board determines to move forward, in developing
parameters it is directed to “draw upon best practices at the federal and state
level.”149  This entails developing parameters that respond to the severity,
complexity, and rigidness that plague the federal system.  And while Booker
made clear that any attempt at binding federal guidelines was unconstitu-
tional, even suggestive guidelines may still in effect be unduly restrictive.150
This could go even further in the military context where the parameters will
“set a boundary on the judge’s discretion, subject to a departure for case
specific reasons set forth by the judge in the record.”151  While a military
judge is protected by the UCMJ from undue command influence, it is
unlikely a military judge, or any judge, will be unaware of outside pressures.
To be effective, and to keep judges effective, the Board needs to ensure that
it assuages judges’ concerns about any type of retribution for a decision, and
that it educates military judges on the best practices for departing from a
guideline.
While the Military Justice Act makes clear that it intends to bring the
court-martial process more in line with the federal sentencing system, it does
not suggest that the procedural and adversarial aspects of sentencing will
change.  Currently, in the federal system, upon a plea or a finding of guilty, a
probation officer conducts a presentence investigation and submits a report
to the court.152  The report must be submitted to the defendant, the defen-
dant’s attorney, and the Government’s attorney at least thirty-five days before
147 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017, Pub. L. No. 114-328, 130
Stat. 2025 (to be codified in scattered sections of 10 U.S.C.).
148 This focus for the military is not new and has been respected by the courts. See
Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137, 140 (1953) (plurality opinion) (“Military law . . . is a juris-
prudence which exists separate and apart from the law which governs in our federal judi-
cial establishment. . . . [T]he rights of men in the armed forces must perforce be
conditioned to meet certain overriding demands of discipline and duty, and the civil
courts are not the agencies which must determine the precise balance to be struck in this
adjustment.” (footnote omitted)).
149 MILITARY JUSTICE REVIEW GRP., supra note 79, at 19.
150 See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
151 MILITARY JUSTICE REVIEW GRP., supra note 79, at 19.
152 See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, GUIDELINES MANUAL § 6A1.1 cmt. (2015) (“A thor-
ough presentence investigation ordinarily is essential in determining the facts relevant to
sentencing.”).  This general requirement cannot be waived by the defendant. Id.
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sentencing.153  Both parties have fourteen days to respond, and the proba-
tion officer must submit the final presentence report to the parties at least
seven days before sentencing.154  This process is relatively removed from the
adversarial nature of a trial, and more in line with the calculating nature of
sentencing.
The military system, however, still maintains an adversarial nature.  Fur-
thermore, the sentence is expected to be completed as quickly after the trial
as possible.155  Occasionally, if a verdict is delivered later in the day, a mili-
tary judge may push the sentence on to the next duty day, or it can be pushed
back a few hours, but this is not required.156  The expectation of the lawyers
is that their arguments are prepared and their witnesses ready to be called if
the sentencing phase immediately follows trial.157  Because there is no pre-
sentencing report agreed to by the parties, the prosecution must prove any
aggravating circumstances.158  The defense is also given “considerable lati-
tude” in presenting witnesses and mitigating evidence.159
As demonstrated by the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, increases in
severity are the norm for sentences under guidelines.  In the new system, the
trial counsel has a sentence floor, which increases the Government’s power
in plea bargaining too.  The defendant does have a ceiling, but could already
rely on the Courts of Criminal Appeals in extreme situations prior to the
Military Justice Act.160  While a two-day delay would have been beneficial
even prior to the changes in the Act, with sentencing guidelines to the detri-
ment of the defendant, it is even more important to ensure the sentencing
phase of the court-martial is as thorough as possible.
A reasonable opportunity exists for the prosecution and defense to make
sound sentencing arguments.  The deck is stacked against no one, and both
are given reasonable latitude.  However, that reasonable opportunity for
soundness does not necessarily translate into the best process for a just sen-
tence.  The defendant may be left reeling that he or she was just convicted of
a crime, possibly a serious one, even as a mitigation case needs to be
presented.  The defense attorney presumably will have done everything
within reason to obtain a not-guilty verdict for the defendant whose case was
just argued, and then must immediately be prepared to demonstrate why that
guilty client should be given a lenient sentence.  To make any sort of coher-
ent argument, and certainly to have witnesses prepared, the defense attorney
must plan on this contingency before beginning the trial.  The defense attor-
153 Id. § 6A1.2(a).  This requirement can be waived by the defendant.  Id.
154 Id. § 6A1.2(b)–(c).
155 See MCM, supra note 16, R.C.M. 1001(a)(2) (“A sentence shall be adjudged in all
cases without unreasonable delay.”).
156 Robert F. Holland, Unique Procedural Aspects of Court-Martial Sentencing by Jury, 27 FED.




160 See Kisor, supra note 13, at 51 (“[M]ilitary service courts of criminal appeals have the
discretion to reduce an inappropriately severe sentence.”).
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ney would make a better, more reasoned argument for mitigation if that was
the only argument to prepare.  Instead, sometimes the following arguments
are what the court-martial and defendant get: “The accused needs to be with
his family.  Years in prison will only mean that he may never see them again.
They need him.  Any double digit number is going to be too much.”161  The
preceding sentencing arguments might have been better and more reasoned
if the defense attorney had two days after the trial to focus on the sentencing
argument.  It is not unreasonable to expect, along the same lines, that the
defense attorney may serve as better counsel during the trial if the only focus
was on a not-guilty verdict.
Furthermore, the trial counsel is affected in much the same way.  While
the trial counsel will not need to turn around from a loss, the preparation
will still be divided up between two tasks instead of focused on one.  In the
case of a not-guilty verdict, the trial counsel’s time spent preparing for sen-
tencing may have been spent better in preparation for the trial phase.
Finally, it is not unreasonable to expect that the trial counsel’s personal feel-
ings of frustration towards the defendant will carry over into sentencing.  In
the current environment, trial counsel may resort to arguments like the fol-
lowing: “The accused needs to go to jail for at least twenty-eight years.  He is
twenty-two years old right now.  He will be fifty when he gets out. . . . Your
Honor, you should add up the minor victims’ ages and make the accused
serve confinement for that long.”162  These haphazard arguments may be
improved if the trial counsel has time to prepare and does not face multiple
contingencies within fixed time constraints.
Finally, a delay of two days between conviction and sentencing may have
a strong impact on the defendant.  In civilian courts, an “[e]xpression[ ] of
remorse can reduce prison sentences by more than a third.”163  Imagine the
mindset of a defendant who just spent an entire trial proclaiming his inno-
cence but is nonetheless convicted of the crime.  Then consider that in order
to receive a smaller sentence, that defendant is expected to make a heartfelt
apology shortly after, even within a few hours.  Two days would give the
defendant the opportunity to come to grips with the guilt just assigned by the
community, and coming to grips with that guilt may lead to a more heartfelt
apology.  This may benefit the rehabilitation of the defendant, and “victims
themselves say that emotional harm is healed, as opposed to compensated
for, only by an act of emotional repair.”164  It is no secret that apologies from
the guilty “often are stilted, forced, or just not enough.”165  But the possibility
of an improved apology is worth the negligible risks.
161 Charles L. Pritchard, Jr., “Punished as a Court-Martial May Direct”: Making Meaningful
Sentence Requests, ARMY LAW., Dec. 2015, at 33 (internal quotation marks omitted).
162 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
163 STEPHANOS BIBAS, THE MACHINERY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 74 (2012).
164 Heather Strang & Lawrence W. Sherman, Repairing the Harm: Victims and Restorative
Justice, 2003 UTAH L. REV. 15, 22.
165 BIBAS, supra note 163, at 74.
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A mandatory delay between a conviction and sentencing is not without
precedent.  In the late 1950s the appellate division of New York’s supreme
court held in several cases that a trial court must follow a statute requiring a
two-day delay between a guilty verdict (including a plea) and sentencing, and
failure of a trial court to do so would invalidate a sentencing.166  A defendant
in Oregon has a statutory right of two calendar days following a guilty plea or
verdict before sentencing.167  In State v. Dawson the Oregon Court of Appeals
held that a violation of the statute is cause for a remand and resentencing.168
During a turn-of-the-century murder case in Kentucky, the highest court
determined that a violation of the criminal code that mandated a two-day
delay between a verdict and judgment warranted a reversal.169  It reasoned
that the code “contain[ed] a most solemn and vital right of the accused.  Its
meaning is upon the surface.  It requires no reflection to understand it.  It
was enacted for the express purpose of giving the accused time in which to
show cause against the sentence about to be passed upon him.”170
One clear implication of this suggested delay is a slowdown of justice.
However, as noted above, in the federal system there are at least thirty-five
days between a conviction or guilty plea and sentencing (plus however long it
takes the probation officer to submit the report).171  A delay of a few days
pales in comparison to that month.  Furthermore, just as a defendant can
waive this time requirement in the federal system (although there will still
likely be a brief delay as the probation officer writes the report), this option
could also be given to defendants in a court-martial.  Either before or after
the trial the judge can ask the defendant if he would like to waive his right to
a brief delay before sentencing.
But the importance of speedy justice has an impact on the functionality
of the military as well.172  The military functions as smaller units that are part
of larger units, and “everyone knows or at least has a perception about when
and whether ‘justice has been done.’”173  However, the delays that have
166 See, e.g., People ex rel. La Shombe v. Jackson, 184 N.Y.S.2d 949, 949 (App. Div. 1959)
(“A failure to allow two days between conviction and sentence, if properly pleaded . . .
would invalidate the sentence.”); People ex rel. Ingber v. Jackson, 172 N.Y.S.2d 358, 358
(App. Div. 1958) (same concept).
167 See OR. REV. STAT. § 137.020 (2015).  The court may sentence sooner if it does not
intend to be in session, but it should be “as remote a time as can reasonably be allowed,”
and no sooner than six hours unless waived by the defendant. Id.
168 284 P.3d 1272, 1276 (Or. Ct. App. 2012) (“[O]ur focus is on the court’s disregard of
an important statutory right . . . whose purpose, in part, is to ensure the deliberate and
carefully considered pronouncement of judgment in criminal cases.”).
169 Powers v. Commonwealth, 83 S.W. 146 (Ky. 1904).
170 Id. at 148; see also People v. Felix, 45 Cal. 163, 164 (1872) (“The purpose of the
statute seems to be to guard the rights of the prisoner from a hasty or too precipitous entry
of judgment against him.”).
171 See supra notes 152–54 and accompanying text.
172 See Baker, supra note 29, at 81 (“[T]he timely administration of justice, has long
been viewed as a strength of the military justice system.”).
173 Id.
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caused concerns in the military process come not from the sentencing phase
of a court-martial but from the post-sentencing process.174  Given the
extraordinary length of sentencing delays that can occur after courts-martial
conclude, it is unreasonable to argue that a few days in between conviction
and sentencing will unduly prejudice good order and discipline.  Further-
more, depending on the circumstances, there may be other options available
to remove the defendant from the unit.175
A final argument against the delay between a conviction and sentencing
is that it may lead to disruptions of an efficient military justice system.  This
argument falls short because the federal system has demonstrated an ability
to operate without an immediate rush from conviction to sentencing.  Fur-
thermore, the military justice system operates with a “relatively light
caseload—extremely light compared with civilian criminal justice sys-
tems.”176  Finding the time for two segmented phases of a court-martial may
initially prove more complicated, but will likely just become part of the pro-
cess with which the military justice system functions.  Finally, this recommen-
dation has the ability to actually increase efficiency in the military justice
system by minimizing wasted work.  In the case of a not-guilty verdict, neither
the defense attorney nor trial counsel will have spent government time and
resources preparing for sentencing.
CONCLUSION
The foregoing recommendations to improve implementation of the Mil-
itary Justice Act need not happen overnight.  Effectively implementing just
the changes the Act recommends may be trouble enough initially.  A two-day
delay between a conviction and sentencing does not have to come from an
act of Congress or an order from the President.  Individual services, and even
174 See id. “[M]ilitary case law makes clear . . . that there have been problems with
appellate delay in the military . . . . [T]he convening authority in approving findings and
sentence as well as in reviewing for clemency often adds weeks, months, and sometimes
even years to the court-martial process.” Id.; see, e.g., United States v. Harvey, 64 M.J. 13, 23
(C.A.A.F. 2006) (“Simply stated, the 2,031 days for a first-level appellate review by a service
court of criminal appeals is facially unreasonable as it clearly is excessive and inordinate.”);
United States v. Moreno, 63 M.J. 129, 136–37 (C.A.A.F. 2006) (holding that 1688 days
between the conclusion of the court-martial and the decision of the Court of Criminal
Appeals was facially unreasonable and that 490 days between the court-martial and
approval by the convening authority was excessive).
175 The most severe avenue available is pretrial confinement.  Probable cause must exist
for pretrial confinement, which consists of a reasonable belief that: “(1) An offense triable
by court-martial has been committed; (2) The person confined committed it; and (3) Con-
finement is required by the circumstances.”  MCM, supra note 16, R.C.M. 305.  The
required circumstances are that it is foreseeable that the defendant will not appear at trial
or will engage in “serious criminal misconduct,” and restraint of a less severe nature is
inadequate. Id.  Also available is pretrial restraint, a less severe restriction on a person’s
liberty.  It may consist of conditions on liberty, restriction in lieu of arrest, arrest, or con-
finement. Id. R.C.M. 304.
176 Ehlenbeck, supra note 36, at 33.
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individual judges, can create opportunities to observe the recommended
delay and determine if it improves the military justice system.  At little or no
cost to the machine, the proposed delay may bring out the best in all
involved in the military sentencing process.
A delay between conviction and sentencing will not create a perfect sen-
tence for a guilty defendant, nor a perfect system for military sentencing.
But, it may be able to make military justice better.
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